Norway and Russia share a 197,7 km long border. This implies that the countries have had to and must continue to deal with each other. Norway and Russia have a longstanding relationship founded on trade and mutual interests. The relationship with Russia is arguably the most important bilateral relation in Norwegian foreign policy.
In the 19th century, the so called “pomor” trade flourished where approximately four hundred Russian ships sailed to Northern Norway every summer to exchange goods.[1] The “pomor” trade had begun in the 1700s and ended in 1917 as a result of the Bolshevik revolution.[2] The Bolshevik’s limited the economic independence of Russian framers and trade consequently diminished.[3] Up until 1917, the “pomor” trade had positive economic implications for both countries, but also brought the inhabitants closer together socially. This bond remains important today.
The social connection was particularly evident in the development of a pidgin language, “moja på tvoja”, also referred to as “Russian-Norwegian, that unlike most pidgin languages consisted of an equal amount of words from Russian and Norwegian.[4] This equality was perceived as a symbol that Russians and Norwegians were socially equal partners.[5] Language exchange, between the two neighbors, remains crucial today as a symbol of equality and respect. Sør-Varanger municipality hosts Norway’s only official border crossing to Russia named Storskog. In Sør-Varangers largest city Kirkenes, the Russian language has become so common that both street signs and commerce are written in Russian. You are also likely to hear both Norwegians and Russians, communicating in Russian.
Historically, the perception of an alleged Russian desire for access to ice-free ports in Norway, has been an important element in the Norwegian threat assessment vis-à-vis Russia.[6] The geopolitical logic of proximity to Russia has been an instrumental part of Norwegian national security assessment since the 19th century. This assessment has remained important regardless of the abilities and perceived ambitions of the Russian government.[7] Despite this continuous security awareness, there has never been an attack from Russia against Norway in over 600 years.[8] This is when one disregards the Russian attack on the German occupation forces in Finmark,1944. [9] With its fourteen neighboring countries, Russia has been at war with all of them, except Norway.[10] This is a fact with instrumental societal importance in northern Norway and is frequently emphasized while discussing the Russian-Norwegian relationship. [11]
Norwegian-Russian relations were especially soft during the Second World War where the two countries were allies against a common enemy. [12] Norway particularly recognizes the Soviet army for liberating Eastern Finnmark in 1944, but also for withdrawing all troops from Norway within a year. [13] The most significant impression made on the Norwegians during the War, was the approximately 90,000 Soviet citizens held as German Prisoners of War in Norway from 1941-1945. [14] The inhumane treatment of the prisoners generated instrumental sympathy from the general Norwegian population. In various places the local Norwegian inhabitants exposed themselves to grave danger to aid the prisoners with food. Some went as far as to aid the prisoners in escaping Nazi captivity. [15] This shared war experience is a critical component in what is referred to as the “historical friendship between Norway and Russia, this relationship prevails particularly in northern Norway. [16]
Post the Cold War, the newly established Russian Federation had a very different relationship with the West in comparison to the Soviet Union. Russian President, Boris Jeltsin, quickly expressed a firm desire for a strong cooperation with the Western world.[17] The end of the Cold War significantly changed the strategic situation in the High North, as the West and the “new” Russia was not on a collision course in the same way as before. [18] With the softening of the Western perception of Russia, the Norwegian-Russian political connection grew stronger. This political cooperation became particularly apparent through the Barents Cooperation established as a result of the Kirkenes declaration on January 11th, 1993.[19] Despite optimism, in regard to the fruitfulness of the cooperation, there was also some skepticism in Norway in terms of bilateralism. Norway consequently rejected the Russian proposal of including security policy in the cooperation between the two countries. [20]
In the 1990s a significant portion, of both NATO and Russia’s focus, was turned towards other conflicts in other parts of the world. The interest in the High North and thus Norway diminished, [21]. This development caused increased security skepticism in Norway, as a result of the proximity to Russia. Russia was perceived with an uncertain future but still inhabiting substantial military capabilities. [22] The Norwegian defense and security policy thus remained focused on the High North despite pressure from allies. Additionally, Norwegian policy increasingly emphasized the need to “normalize” relations with Russia. The perception was that Norwegian-Russian relations should not be noteworthy different than Norwegian relations with other nations. [23]
Simultaneously, Norway gradually sought to encourage increased Allied military presence in its territory to counteract NATO’s reduced focus on the High North. This policy change had great implications for Norway’s self-imposed restrictions on Allied military forces on Norwegian territory. The aim of the self-imposed restrictions were to calm Russia in terms of Norwegian military strategy, as well as emphasize that Norwegian territory should under no circumstances be used as a springboard for allied attacks towards Russia. [24] The changes in the restrictions were attempted justified by practical considerations but were nevertheless received negatively in Russia, despite the Allied presence in Norway being low. [25] Despite the negativity, military relations were established between Norway and Russia in the north. These military relations were both of a bilateral as well as a multilateral nature and were linked greatly to cooperation in search and rescue missions, but also included joint exercises. Direct links between the respective military headquarters were established to prevent misunderstanding and crises.[26]
Norway and Russia still share an interest in “détente” (release from tension) in the High North. Following the Cold War, in 1994, Norway and Russia began a military exercise collaboration, exercise “Pomor”. “Pomor” was intended to promote military cooperation between Norway and Russia in areas where both nations share common interests and objectives. [27] The exercise was reconducted in 2010 as well as in 2013 when it also included training in anti-piracy operations, boarding exercises, shooting and aerial exercises, as well as search and rescue. The “Pomor” exercises were conducted in the Norwegian and the Barents Sea. [28]
In 2013, the Norwegian side was represented by the Coast Guard vessel KV Senja, the frigate KNM Helge Ingstad , F-16 fighter aircraft, an orion maritime patrol aircraft and coastal hunters.[29] On the Russian side, the Udaloy 1 class anti-submarine «Vice Admiral Kulakov», an IL-38 MAY maritime patrol aircraft, SU-33 flanked fighter aircraft, Ka-27 Helix helicopter, a tugboat supporting the other vessels and Navy infantry from the 61st Marine Infantry Regiment.[30] Since Norway ceased all planned bilateral military activities with Russia in March 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, the scheduled 2015 exercise was not conducted. [31]
Russia is not only a potential counterpart to Norway in the High North, but also an important partner in areas of common interest. The arguably best example of Norwegian-Russian cooperation in this area is the fruitful bilateral management of fisheries in the Barents Sea, recognized as one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds. The formal foundation for cooperation was laid in 1975-1976 by two official fisheries agreements. [32] . In a bilateral context, the extension of fisheries cooperation was part of a trend in which Norway and Russia entered into an even closer cooperation in an increasing number of fields; nuclear security, trade, health, development, environment and societal cooperation labeled as “people to people projects”. [33] Historically as well as contemporarily, Russia and Norway remain strong partners.
This article is written by Kristine Kivle, Project coordinator for Munin.Live. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Diplomacy and Military Studies from Hawai’i Pacific University and a Master of Science in Defence, Development and Diplomacy from Durham University. The views expressed in this article are entirely the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of YATA Norway.
Foto: Kilian Munch. Kirkenes, 3.-4. juni 2013 i forbindelse med 20-års markeringa av samarbeid innen Barentsregionen. Russlands tidligere statsminister, Dmitrij Medvedjev, og Norges tidligere statsminister, Jens Stoltenberg.
[1] Balsvik, R. (2015). Russia and Norway: Research Collaboration and Comparison of Asymmetrical Relations. Acta Borealia, 32(1), pp.85-99.
[2] Ibid, pp. 92
[3] Egge, Å. (2019). Bolsjeviker. [online] Store norske leksikon. Available at: https://snl.no/bolsjeviker.
[4] Balsvik, R. (2015). Russia and Norway: Research Collaboration and Comparison of Asymmetrical Relations. Acta Borealia, 32(1), pp.85-99.
[5] Godzimirski, J. (2007). Norge og Russland | NUPI. [online] NUPI. Available at: https://www.nupi.no/Skole/HHD-Artikler/20082/Norge-og-Russland
[6] Rowe, L. (2018). Fornuft og følelser: Norge og Russland etter Krim. Nordisk Østforum, 32(0), pp.1-20.
[7] Kjølberg,A. (2015). Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk og nordområdene, in Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. pp. 7
[8] Kaagaard, H. (2009). Militær krisehåndtering i nordområdene: en analyse av potensialet for sikkerhetspolitiske kriser mellom Norge og Russland, og forsvaret som nasjonalt krisehåndteringsverktøy. Masters. Universitetet i Oslo.
[9] Ibid
[10] Nilssen, A. (2015). Norske premisser: En diskursanalyse av regjeringens og mediers oppfatning av Russland. Master. Universitetet i Oslo.
[11] Siste Skanse. (2016). Directed by K. Stormark. Oslo: Aldrimer.
[12] Nielsen, J. (2003). Norge og Russland. Utenriksdepartementet.
[13] Samuelsen, G. and Lieungh, E. (2014). Frigjøringen av Øst-Finnmark – en rask innføring. [online] NRK. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/frigjoringen-av-ost-finnmark-_-en-rask-innforing-1.11998524
[14] Solhaug, R. (2005). Sovjetiske krigsfanger – et glemt emne. [online] Universitetet i Tromsø. Available at: https://forskning.no/historie-andre-verdenskrig-partner/sovjetiske-krigsfanger—et-glemt-emne/1042788
[15] Ibid
[16] Stenberg, I. and Veum, E. (2014). Økt russisk tilstedeværelse i nord. [online] NRK. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/norge/okt-russisk-tilstedevaerelse-i-nord-1.11983657
[17] Kjølberg,A. (2015). Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk og nordområdene, in Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
[18] Godzimirski, J. (2007). Norge og Russland | NUPI. [online] NUPI. Available at: https://www.nupi.no/Skole/HHD-Artikler/20082/Norge-og-Russland
[19] Rowe, L. and Hønneland, G. (2010). Norge og Russland: Tilbake til normaltilstand. Nordisk Østforum, 24(2), pp.133-147.
[20] Kaagaard, H. (2009). Militær krisehåndtering i nordområdene: en analyse av potensialet for sikkerhetspolitiske kriser mellom Norge og Russland, og forsvaret som nasjonalt krisehåndteringsverktøy. Masters. Universitetet i Oslo.pp.7
[21] Ibid
[22] Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
[23] Ibid
[24] Gade,J.G., Hilde,P.S.(2015). Nordområdenes sikkerhetspolitiske betydning for NATO, in Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
[25] Børresen, J., Gjeseth, G. and Tamnes, R. (2004). Norsk forsvarshistorie, bind5, 1970-2000, allianseforsvar i endring. Bergen: Eide forlag.
[26] Kjølberg,A. (2015). Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk og nordområdene, in Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
[27] Forsvaret. (2014). Pomor. [online] Available at: https://forsvaret.no/fakta/aktivitet/ovelser/pomor
[28] Børresen,J.(2015). Norske interesser i nord- det maritime aspektet, in Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
[29] VG. (2011). Norske fartøy skal øve i Russland. [online] Available at: https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/6LPwL/norske-fartoey-skal-oeve-i-russland.
[30] VG. (2011). Norske fartøy skal øve i Russland. [online] Available at: https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/6LPwL/norske-fartoey-skal-oeve-i-russland
[31] Forsvaret (2014). Forsvarets årsrapport for 2014. pp.1-189. pp.95
[32] Hønneland,G.,& Jørgensen,A.K.(2015). Kompromisskulturen i Barentshavet, in Kjølberg, A. and Heier, T. (2015). Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
[33] Rowe, L. and Hønneland, G. (2010). Norge og Russland: Tilbake til normaltilstand. Nordisk Østforum, 24(2), pp.133-147.